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[1167] 
Reducing Civil Litigation Costs by 
Promoting Technological Innovation: 
Adopting Standards of Reasonableness 
in E-Discovery 
Kelly Foss* 
Discovery costs have ballooned over the last decade, in large part because attorneys 
must review vast amounts of electronically stored information (“ESI”) for relevancy 
and privilege and must collect all potentially relevant ESI on which to perform those 
reviews. Courts can reduce costs associated with reviewing ESI by finding that the use 
of recently developed search software can be “reasonable” under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(g) and Federal Rule of Evidence 502. Courts also can ultimately reduce 
costs associated with collecting ESI by taking into account the reasonableness of 
parties’ prelitigation document-management systems when determining whether to 
require production of inaccessible ESI at a responding party’s expense. Historically, 
courts were more likely to require production of inaccessible documents when the 
responding party had assumed the risks of high production costs by storing its 
information in a particular manner. In recent years, courts have retreated from this 
approach; some courts rejected the assumption-of-risk doctrine in favor of considering 
the reasonableness of the responding party’s document-management policies under the 
circumstances, while other courts explicitly refused to consider reasonableness. The 
latter approach has dominated in the courts since the FRCP were amended in 2006. 
This Note proposes that courts reinstate the reasonableness standard when deciding 
whether to grant motions to compel or to protect. By doing so, courts will incentivize 
the implementation of document-management systems that facilitate inexpensive 
discovery. This proposed approach will also stimulate technological innovation in the 
document-management software industry, which ultimately will lead to reduced 
discovery costs. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012. I would like to 
thank Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., for his assistance in writing this Note. 
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The relatively new phenomenon of clients retaining vast amounts of 
electronically stored information (“ESI”) has led to an exponential 
increase in civil litigation discovery costs in the last decade. Costs have 
increased so rapidly that the legal community has joined in an effort to 
reduce costs for clients. Lawyers, judges, and academics attended the 
Sedona Conference in 2003 to discuss ESI discovery issues, and have now 
established a working group to “develop principles and best practice 
recommendations for electronic document retention and production in 
civil litigation.”1 
Despite the efforts in recent years to reduce the cost of discovery, 
eighty-five percent of attorneys believe that discovery is still too expensive, 
according to a recent study.2 This Note discusses two main reasons why e-
discovery is expensive—document review and collection—and urges 
courts to implement certain discovery rules in a way that will incentivize 
the utilization of technological advancements that could cut down on 
costs. In considering (1) whether document reviews for relevancy and 
privilege are adequate, or (2) whether to compel production of ESI that 
is extremely expensive and burdensome to collect, courts should consider 
 
 1. Working Group Series, Sedona Conf., http://www.thesedonaconference.org/wgs (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2012). 
 2. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers & Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Interim 
Report on the Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery 
and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System 4 (2008). 
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the technological capabilities of the parties and hold them to standards of 
reasonableness. Applying standards of reasonableness to both document 
review and prelitigation management of ESI ultimately will help to 
reduce e-discovery costs by stimulating innovation in the e-discovery and 
information-system-management software industries. 
This Note is divided in two parts. Part I explains how courts can 
help litigants reduce discovery costs associated with reviewing ESI by 
finding that the use of certain new technologies to review ESI for 
relevance and privilege satisfies the reasonableness requirements of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 26(g) and Federal Rule of 
Evidence (“FRE”) 502. Reviewing ESI is not the only source of high 
discovery costs, however. Before parties can review ESI for relevance 
and privilege, they must first collect the ESI on which to perform their 
reviews. Part II addresses the high discovery costs associated with 
collecting ESI and explains how poor prelitigation document management 
contributes to inflated collection costs. Part II.A surveys how courts 
historically have considered the nature of a party’s document-
management system when deciding whether to require production of 
documents at that party’s expense. Part II.B explains how these historical 
notions of reasonableness changed leading up to the 2006 amendments to 
the FRCP: Courts became less likely to question a party’s management 
of its ESI. Part II.C shows how Congress’s 2006 enactment of 
FRCP 26(b)(2)(B), the so-called “two-tiered approach” or “balancing 
test,” caused courts to ignore the unreasonableness of parties’ document-
management systems when deciding whether to compel production.  
Next, Part II.D briefly discusses the common law doctrine of 
spoliation (the destruction of relevant evidence), which contains one of 
the only remaining legal standards of reasonableness in document 
management. Although some courts have performed a spoliation-like 
analysis when deciding whether to require production of inaccessible 
ESI, the enactment of FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) makes clear that spoliation is 
no longer the appropriate test when ESI is inaccessible; Congress has 
designed FRCP 26(b)(2)(B)’s two-tiered approach for that purpose. 
Thus, Part II.E proposes that courts, when performing the proper two-
tiered approach under FRCP 26(b)(2)(B), as when performing a spoliation 
analysis, take into account the reasonableness of parties’ document-
management systems even though reasonableness is not explicitly 
mentioned in the rule or the Advisory Committee notes. This proposed 
approach is authorized by the current rules, will foster technological 
innovation in ESI management, and ultimately will decrease discovery 
costs associated with collection. 
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I.  Reasonable Software Solutions for Document Review 
E-discovery is costly largely because of the volume of ESI that 
attorneys must review and the time they spend reviewing the ESI for 
responsive and privileged documents.3 Attorneys may face sanctions for 
failing to perform an adequate review before responding to a discovery 
request. Under FRCP 26(g), “[e]very disclosure . . . must be signed by at 
least one attorney of record . . . . [certifying] that to the best of the 
person’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable 
inquiry . . . [the disclosure] is complete and correct.”4 Improper 
certification may lead to sanctions.5 Additionally, under FRE 502(b), a 
failure to take “reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” of privileged 
documents may result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or of 
work-product protection.6 Thus, before producing ESI requested by an 
opposing counsel, an attorney must review all of the collected ESI for 
both relevancy and privilege,7 and the review must be reasonable. The 
legal community’s desire to reduce discovery costs through the 
endorsement of new e-discovery search software as an alternative to 
performing manual document review is evidenced by the recent 
enactment of FRE 502(b) and emerging case law. 
Traditionally, in performing a review for the purposes of the 
discovery and privilege rules, firms have employed document-review 
teams consisting of attorneys who manually review all potentially 
relevant documents. As ESI has become more voluminous over the 
years, document-review teams have increased in size. Often more than 
ten attorneys bill one client for hundreds of hours spent rifling through 
millions of pages of documents. In such scenarios, the document-review-
team approach can result in enormous costs to the client. Although 
assigning document-review teams to physically look through potential 
 
 3. See eDiscovery Solutions Group Announces Early Case Assessment (ECA) Tool, eDiscovery 
Solutions Group (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.ediscoverysolutionsgroup.com/PressReleases-092910.html 
(“[S]urveys by leading industry analysts indicate that 70% of the cost of eDiscovery is consumed in the 
document review process.”). 
 4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1) (emphasis added). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Fed. R. Evid. 502(b) (“[A] disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state 
proceeding if: (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took 
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the 
error . . . .”). Before the enactment of FRE 502(b) on inadvertent disclosures, some courts would find 
that waiver had occurred even if the disclosure was inadvertent. See, e.g., Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 148 F.R.D. 456, 457 (D.D.C. 1992). 
 7. See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 254, 262 (D. Md. 2008) (noting 
that “search terms . . . aimed at locating responsive ESI, rather than identifying privileged or work-
product protected documents” would not qualify as a sufficient privilege review and, therefore, that 
the party must search for both responsiveness and privilege). 
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documents is considered a “reasonable inquiry,” under the FRCP,8 often 
it is no longer financially feasible for clients engaged in large-scale 
litigation. 
Only in recent years has technology begun to adapt to help solve the 
document-review cost problem. Attorneys have begun making use of 
document-organization programs, such as Concordance, that allow them 
to perform complex keyword searches on collected ESI.9 An attorney 
“imports e-documents and [the program] retains original source 
formatting, metadata, hyperlinks to native documents, and relationships 
between e-mail and attachments.”10 The entire collection is searchable 
for keywords decided upon by the parties, and as long as a party selects 
keywords reasonably designed to retrieve documents responsive to the 
discovery request, courts have considered this method of document 
review to be adequate.11 
Recognizing that keyword searches on millions of pages of ESI is 
less than completely accurate but that parties cannot possibly perform 
manual reviews in cases involving voluminous ESI, Congress enacted 
FRE 502(b) in 2008 in part to treat inadvertent disclosures of privileged 
materials more leniently.12 The rule provides that an inadvertent 
disclosure will not result in a waiver of privilege if the “holder of the 
privilege . . . took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” and “promptly 
took reasonable steps to rectify the error” once it realized that it had 
disclosed privileged materials.13 The Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory 
Committee explained that it drafted the new rule to respond “to the 
widespread complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect against 
waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product have become 
prohibitive due to the concern that any disclosure (however innocent or 
minimal) will operate as a subject matter waiver of all protected 
communications or information,” and noted that “[t]his concern is 
 
 8. See, e.g., Kandel v. Brother Int’l Corp., 683 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1085–86 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(finding that a party had taken reasonable steps to prevent disclosure of privileged documents by 
staffing and training a document-review team). 
 9. Concordance, Advantage Companies, http://www.advantage-companies.com/litigation/ 
concordance (last visited Mar. 17, 2012); Concordance, LexisNexis, http://law.lexisnexis.com/concordance 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012).  
 10. LexisNexis, supra note 9.  
 11. “The use of key words has been endorsed as a search method for reducing the need for 
human review of large volumes of ESI. As noted in the case of In re Seroquel Products Liability, 
however, it must be ‘a cooperative and informed process [which includes] sampling and other quality 
assurance techniques.’” Thomas Y. Allman, Conducting E-Discovery After the Amendments: The 
Second Wave, 10 Sedona Conf. J. 215, 223 (2009) (citing In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 
650, 662 (M.D. Fla. 2007)). 
 12. Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note (discussing the purposes of the new rule). 
 13. Fed. R. Evid. 502(b). 
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especially troubling in cases involving electronic discovery.”14 Thus, 
courts and rulemakers have endorsed keyword searches of ESI as a 
reasonable method of document review. 
Newer software programs go even further and do not require 
attorneys to formulate keyword searches at all. Instead, using intelligent 
search and document-analysis software like Equivio, a lead attorney on a 
case reviews a sample of documents and scores them for relevance and 
privilege.15 The software uses the sample to create an algorithm, which it 
then uses to score all of the collected documents. The software feeds 
scored samples to the attorney and is self-correcting in that it revises the 
algorithm based on further feedback from the attorney. Such technology 
has not been in use long enough to give rise to much case law evaluating 
its reasonableness. However, at least one court has found that using 
software like Equivio constitutes taking “reasonable steps” for the 
purposes of avoiding waiver of privilege under FRE 502, which covers 
inadvertent disclosures.16 
In United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., the plaintiff used Equivio to 
perform its privilege review.17 After producing a total of 45,000 
documents, the plaintiff realized that it had inadvertently disclosed 214 
privileged documents.18 A New Jersey district court commended the 
plaintiff’s “effort to employ a sophisticated computer program to conduct 
its privilege review.”19 In holding that the plaintiff had not waived 
privilege under FRE 502 because it had taken reasonable steps to 
prevent disclosure, the court noted that the “[p]laintiff should not be 
unduly punished for occasional mistakes that occurred while it started to 
use new software to organize and sort its documents.”20 The court’s 
willingness to find that the use of novel document-analysis software 
constituted taking “reasonable steps”21 to prevent disclosure reflects an 
understanding that standards of reasonableness in the discovery rules 
should evolve as ESI search technology advances.22 
 
 14. Fed. R. Evid. 502 advisory committee’s note (“[E]lectronic discovery may encompass 
‘millions of documents’ and to insist upon ‘record-by-record pre-production privilege review, on pain 
of subject matter waiver, would impose upon parties costs of production that bear no proportionality 
to what is at stake in the litigation.’” (quoting Hopson v. Mayor of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 
2005))). 
 15. See Culling, Equivio, http://www.equivio.com/scenario.php?ID=2 (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 16. United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., No. 07-1275 (JHR/JS), 2009 WL 2905474, at *1, *4 
(D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009). 
 17. Id. at *1. 
 18. Id. at *1–2. 
 19. Id. at *4. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Fed. R. Evid. 502. 
 22. As one district court noted in Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005):  
The unavoidable truth is that it is no longer remarkable that electronic document discovery 
Foss_63-HLJ-1167 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:27 PM 
May 2012]       STANDARDS OF REASONABLENESS IN E-DISCOVERY 1173 
 
Another kind of advanced case assessment software called FirstCull 
“automatically scans and assesses data (from hard drives, entire 
computers, servers, removable media, whole networks, etc.), and then 
generates a series of easy to read reports that categorically detail the key 
attributes about that information.”23 One e-discovery consultant group 
explained that FirstCull helps reduce the costs of document review 
because it “enables users to easily identify potential electronic 
evidence[,] . . . unpack any files . . . such [as] ZIP, CAB, RAR and TAR 
file types, [and] determine file sizes and generate a set of standard 
reports to calculate the magnitude and cost of . . . document review.”24 To 
support the exploration of new technological solutions by civil litigants 
and their e-discovery vendors, courts should monitor these potential new 
software solutions and assess whether they are reasonable methods of 
reviewing ESI for relevancy or privilege. For example, although the use 
of FirstCull might not alone be sufficient, using FirstCull in conjunction 
with other methods of document review might result in a finding of 
reasonableness. Parties can assist courts to understand new technology 
by presenting e-discovery expert witnesses to explain the reasonableness 
or unreasonableness of advanced ESI review software.25 
Evolution of standards of reasonableness is also evidenced by the 
fact that parties now frequently agree to use new types of litigation 
software as a part of their proposed discovery plans and meet-and-confer 
reports under FRCP 26(f).26 This practice demonstrates that litigants 
have a growing desire to reduce costs and that they consider the use of 
many technological and software solutions to be reasonable methods of 
reviewing documents for relevancy and privilege. 
Case law, the enactment of FRE 502(b), and party stipulations to 
use of document-review software demonstrate that the standards of 
 
may encompass hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of electronic records that are 
potentially discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1). In this environment, to insist in every case 
upon ‘old world’ record-by-record pre-production privilege review, on pain of subject 
matter waiver, would impose upon parties costs of production that bear no proportionality 
to what is at stake in the litigation . . . . 
In fact, the Advisory Committee has specifically endorsed the use of “advanced analytical software 
applications and linguistic tools” for performing a privilege review in certain circumstances. See Fed. 
R. Evid. 502(b) advisory committee’s note. 
 23. FirstCull, Xpriori, http://xpriori.com/content/firstcull/firstcull-overview (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 24. eDiscovery Solutions Group, supra note 3. 
 25. See United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 2008) (requiring parties to 
submit expert testimony on the adequacy of one party’s ESI searches to assist the court in ruling on a 
motion to compel production). 
 26. FRCP 26(f) requires the parties to meet and confer at an early stage in the litigation to 
prepare a discovery plan. In fact, some local rules state that the parties must be prepared to discuss the 
use of litigation support software at preliminary conferences. See, e.g., Nassau Cnty. Commercial 
Div., Guidelines for Discovery of Electronically Stored Information 3–5 (2009). 
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reasonableness for document review, for both relevancy and privilege, 
have evolved27 to encompass the use of cutting-edge technology as an 
alternative to employing large document-review teams. A flexible 
interpretation of the reasonableness requirements of FRCP 26(g) and 
FRE 502 is consistent with the legal community’s desire to reduce 
discovery costs and increase efficiency. No matter how efficiently new 
technology allows attorneys to review documents for relevancy and 
privilege, however, it is often of little use unless the attorney first collects 
all of the potentially relevant ESI and loads it into a searchable system. 
The collection problem has led to an entirely new dimension of e-
discovery-related costs. 
II.  Reasonableness in Document Management 
Before a party can make use of advanced search and document-
analysis software, it must first collect all of the potentially relevant ESI 
on which to perform its review. And before responding to another 
party’s discovery request, an attorney has a duty to make a “reasonable 
inquiry” to assure that her response and accompanying production of 
documents is “complete and correct.”28 A reasonable inquiry encompasses 
not only a reasonable review of compiled ESI, as discussed in Part I, but 
also a reasonable search for sources of potentially relevant ESI.29 For 
example, assume an attorney, representing a plaintiff in an employment 
discrimination matter, receives a request from the defendant for 
discovery of all communications between the plaintiff and her supervisor 
during a particular period of time. The attorney uses keywords to 
 
 27. Cf. Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 148 F.R.D. 456, 457 (D.D.C. 1992) 
(holding that the failure to locate and screen any privileged document from production to the 
opposing party results in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, even if the disclosure was 
inadvertent), superseded by Fed. R. Evid. 502(b); Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting the plaintiff’s demand that the defendants manually review the documents). 
The Treppel court also noted, 233 F.R.D. at 374, that:  
Even in a case involving exclusively hard copy documents, there is no obligation on the part 
of a responding party to examine every scrap of paper in its potentially voluminous files in 
order to comply with its discovery obligations. Rather, it must conduct a diligent search, 
which involves developing a reasonably comprehensive search strategy. Such a strategy 
might, for example, include [electronic searches]. 
 28. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1). 
 29. See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B, 2010 WL 1336937, at *4–6 (S.D. Cal. 
2010) (noting that in responding to a discovery request, an attorney should have searched travel 
records, certain of his client’s employees’ personal computers, and other sources for responsive 
documents, but holding that sanctions for failing to perform a “reasonable inquiry” under FRCP 26(g) 
were improper only because the attorney had been misled by his client into believing the documents 
did not exist); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(noting that a party has a duty to preserve and collect documents from the “key players” in the 
litigation). 
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perform a reasonable search of her client’s personal computer hard 
drive, work computer hard drive, and scanned hard copy files, and 
produces to the defendant the results of her search. The attorney fails, 
however, to search her client’s cell phone SIM card and, as a result, the 
produced documents do not contain responsive text message 
communications. A court might find that even though the attorney 
performed a reasonable review of the documents she collected, she did 
not perform a “reasonable inquiry” into the sources of potentially 
relevant documents. The error in such a situation is a collection error 
rather than a review error, and the attorney might face sanctions for 
improper certification of the document production. 
Costs of collecting potentially relevant ESI have ballooned as ESI 
has grown more voluminous, taken more forms, and become scattered 
through thousands of different sources. For example, potentially relevant 
ESI might be contained in Word documents, Excel spreadsheets, PDFs, 
TIFFs, emails, instant messages, voicemail WAV files, or in any number 
of other formats, and might be located on an employee’s personal 
computer or PDA, a server, a backup tape, a database, or any number of 
other sources. The time and costs associated with locating and collecting 
all potentially relevant ESI can be staggering. 
In looking for ways to reduce discovery-related costs, many courts 
and lawmakers have focused primarily on requiring cooperation between 
the parties during discovery.30 The 2006 amendments to the FRCP codify 
this approach and mandate cooperation between the parties during the 
discovery planning process.31 Although cooperation between parties 
during the discovery process eliminates some unnecessary costs, this 
solution reduces only those costs arising after the filing of litigation. 
Many ESI collection costs, however, arise from activities in which the 
parties are engaged before litigation. For example, courts have frequently 
emphasized that as soon as a party anticipates litigation, it must take 
steps to preserve all potentially relevant documents, even if the suit has 
yet to be filed.32 Counsel must affirmatively monitor client compliance 
 
 30. See In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1769, 2007 WL 219989, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 
2007) (ordering the parties to confer with one another with respect to discovery issues before seeking 
judicial intervention); Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation 
(2008) (“The costs associated with adversarial conduct in pre-trial discovery have become a serious 
burden to the American judicial system.”). 
 31. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (requiring parties to “confer as soon as practicable” to discuss discovery-
related issues, and making the parties responsible for “attempting in good faith to agree on the 
proposed discovery plan”). 
 32. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 222 F.R.D. 280 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“[E]ven valid purging 
programs must be put on hold so as to avoid the destruction of relevant materials when litigation is 
‘reasonably foreseeable.’”). The duty to preserve is not explicitly stated in the FRCP but is widely 
recognized. 
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with such “litigation holds” by identifying and performing an initial 
review of all sources of potentially relevant ESI.33 Failure to comply with 
this “duty to preserve” might result in spoliation sanctions for both the 
client and its attorneys.34 Thus, a party reasonably foreseeing litigation 
must institute a litigation hold and essentially perform an entire round of 
collection and review for relevance before even meeting and conferring 
with opposing counsel.35 Cooperation during a FRCP 26(f) discovery-
planning conference, which takes place shortly after a complaint is filed, 
does not help to reduce the enormous costs associated with complying 
with this duty to preserve. 
As discussed in the Subparts that follow, civil litigants that store 
information in a format that makes the information extremely expensive 
or burdensome to produce may seek a court order allowing them to 
avoid producing that information. Poor management and organization of 
ESI, either before or after the party anticipates litigation, contributes 
significantly to growing costs of collection and has allowed parties that 
institute unreasonable document-management policies to avoid 
producing relevant documents. Despite the significant contribution of 
poorly organized ESI to civil litigation costs, very few courts or critics 
have addressed this problem in recent years. 
A. Historical Notions of Reasonableness 
The advent of ESI made it difficult for courts to apply the discovery 
rules under the FRCP, which originally were fashioned to deal 
exclusively with paper documents. As the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Advisory Committee made clear in the 2006 amendment to 
the discovery rules, although “[ESI] may exist in dynamic databases and 
other forms far different from fixed expression on paper. . . . discovery of 
[ESI] stands on equal footing with discovery of paper documents.”36 
Nevertheless, ESI is often much more difficult and costly to produce than 
paper documents. As the Court of International Trade pointed out in 
Daewoo Electronics Co. v. United States in 1986, 
 
 33. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 34. See Rambus, 222 F.R.D. at 288, 299 (finding that a failure to implement the duty to preserve, 
by failing to halt routine destruction of documents, constitutes spoliation and therefore may subject a 
party to sanctions); Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 437 (explaining that trial court judges have the 
discretion to sanction a party for failing to comply with the duty to preserve during a litigation hold). 
 35. Case law has demonstrated that this is true. For example, Judge Scheindlin, in Zubulake V, 
emphasized that attorneys have a duty to affirmatively “monitor compliance [with a litigation hold] so 
that all sources of discoverable information are identified and searched.” 229 F.R.D. at 432. To comply 
with this obligation, attorneys must communicate with the key players and familiarize themselves with 
the computer and backup systems. Thus, attorneys essentially have to perform an initial round of 
collection prior to meeting with opposing counsel. 
 36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment). 
Foss_63-HLJ-1167 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:27 PM 
May 2012]       STANDARDS OF REASONABLENESS IN E-DISCOVERY 1177 
 
  It would be a dangerous development in the law if new techniques 
for easing the use of information become a hindrance to discovery or 
disclosure in litigation. The use of excessive technical distinctions is 
inconsistent with the guiding principle that information which is stored, 
used, or transmitted in new forms should be available through 
discovery with the same openness as traditional forms. . . . It is also in 
consonance with Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
the revision comments of the Advisory Committee which indicate that 
the rule is intended to keep pace with changing technology.37 
When courts first began dealing with excessive costs related to the 
production of ESI more than a decade before the 2006 amendments to 
the discovery rules, they did take into account parties’ prelitigation 
information-management systems. For example, in In re Brand Name 
Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, a federal district court in Illinois 
wrestled with how to determine whether the costs of requiring 
production would be “undue” when a party refused to produce requested 
emails and alternatively suggested that the requesting party pay for the 
expense of production.38 The court noted that on one hand, sticking the 
responding party with “the lofty expense attendant to creating a special 
computer program for extracting data responsive to a discovery request” 
would be unfair.39 But on the other hand, a party choosing to store its 
documents electronically assumes an “ordinary and foreseeable risk” 
that it might be required to retrieve them.40 The court gave more weight 
to the second consideration and granted the motion to compel 
production at the responding party’s expense.41 
In Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., a Massachusetts trial court similarly 
considered a party’s document-management system when determining 
whether to require that party to engage in expensive ESI production.42 
The plaintiff moved to compel production of backup tapes containing 
email correspondence and the defendants opposed the motion, 
characterizing it as a “multi-million dollar fishing expedition.”43 The 
court granted the motion in part, requiring production of a sample of the 
tapes to analyze for responsiveness.44 Significantly, the court noted that 
the high costs associated with producing backup tapes were 
one of the risks taken on by companies which have made the decision 
to avail themselves of the computer technology now available to the 
 
 37. 10 Ct. Int’l Trade 754, 757 (1986) (citing the Advisory Committee notes to the 1970 
amendments to the discovery rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 527 (1970)). 
 38. Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995). 
 39. Id. at *2. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at *3. 
 42. No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *13. 
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business world. [And t]o permit a corporation . . . to reap the business 
benefits of such technology and simultaneously use that technology as 
a shield in litigation would lead to incongruous and unfair results.45 
Even prior to the advent of ESI, courts sometimes took into account 
the reasonableness of a party’s prelitigation document-management 
system when determining whether to grant a protective order or a 
motion to compel. In Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the plaintiff 
sued a manufacturer of children’s pajamas after his pajamas ignited, 
causing him to suffer severe burns.46 During discovery, the plaintiff 
requested copies of all other complaints or communications of customers 
regarding the burning of children’s nightwear.47 The defendant’s records, 
however, were organized by the claimants’ names rather than by the 
product that was the subject of the complaints.48 Producing the 
documents would have entailed searching through all claims in the Sears 
index, which the defendant complained was “the equivalent of an 
impossible task.”49 The Massachusetts federal district court denied the 
defendant’s motion for a protective order, reasoning that “the costliness 
of the discovery procedure involved [was] entirely a product of the 
defendant’s self-serving indexing scheme.”50 Significantly, the court noted 
that “[t]o allow a defendant whose business generates massive records to 
frustrate discovery by creating an inadequate filing system, and then 
claiming undue burden, would defeat the purposes of the discovery 
rules.”51 
These case studies illustrate that before the turn of the century, 
courts took into consideration the reasons for high costs of production in 
any particular case. If the party responding to the discovery request was 
at fault for, or had assumed the risk of, high collection and production 
costs, courts were less likely to grant a protective order or to shift costs to 
the requesting party. 
B. Changing Notions of Reasonableness Leading to the 2006 
Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules 
A general principle stated by the Sedona Conference is that “[a]n 
organization should have reasonable policies and procedures for 
managing its information and records.”52 Yet in practice this principle has 
 
 45. Id. at *6 (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 1995 WL 360526). 
 46. 73 F.R.D. 73, 74 (D. Mass. 1976). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 75–76. 
 49. Id. at 76. 
 50. Id. at 77. 
 51. Id. at 76. 
 52. Sedona Conference, The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practice Guidelines & Commentary 
for Managing Information & Records in the Electronic Age, at iv, 11–12 (2d ed. 2007) (stating that 
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not often been tested because the Sedona Conference and the legal 
community instead have emphasized the importance of maintaining 
business autonomy with respect to document management53 and 
accordingly have not considered the reasonableness of the document-
management system as a factor when deciding whether to order 
expensive ESI production. For example, two influential decisions in the 
Southern District of New York54 departed from the historical notions of 
reasonableness in document management described previously.55 In 2002, 
that court declined to find that a party storing ESI in an inaccessible 
format had assumed the risk of high production costs.56 In the following 
year, the court explicitly refused to consider the reasonableness of 
prelitigation document management when deciding whether to require 
production of inaccessible ESI.57 These seminal cases influenced the 2006 
amendments to the FRCP’s discovery rules58 and contributed to the 
elimination of the reasonableness consideration in determining whether 
to require production of inaccessible information. 
Shortly before the 2006 amendments, Judge Scheindlin of the 
Southern District of New York, in Zubulake v. USB Warburg LLC 
(“Zubulake I”), set out the basic rule for when a court should consider 
granting a protective order for ESI or shifting the costs of production to 
the requesting party.59 The Zubulake I test formed the basis for the 2006 
amendments.60 Before setting out the test, however, Judge Scheindlin 
first looked to an eight-factor test the same court had designed the 
previous year in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 
Inc.,61 which also was fashioned to assist courts in determining when to 
shift discovery costs.62 
The Rowe court disavowed the approaches taken in In re Brand 
Name Prescription Drugs and Daewoo, where the courts found that the 
 
“identifying and managing information and records should be a business priority” and emphasizing the 
importance of devoting financial and human resources to records-management programs). 
 53. Id. at 14 (“Information and records management requires practical, flexible and scalable 
solutions that address the differences in an organization’s business needs . . . .”). 
 54. Zubulake v. USB Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe Entm’t, 
Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 55. See supra Part II.A. 
 56. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429–32. 
 57. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321–22. 
 58. Benjamin D. Silbert, Note, The 2006 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure: Accessible 
and Inaccessible Electronic Information Storage Devices, Why Parties Should Store Electronic Information 
in Accessible Formats, 13 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 14, ¶ 34 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article14.pdf. 
 59. 217 F.R.D. 309. 
 60. Silbert, supra note 58, ¶ 34 (“With [Zubulake I] as a backdrop, . . . the Judicial Conference of the 
United States set about to rework the Rules to accommodate electronically stored discoverable 
information.”). 
 61. 205 F.R.D. at 429. 
 62. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 316. 
Foss_63-HLJ-1167 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012 6:27 PM 
1180 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1167 
 
responding parties had assumed the risk of producing ESI at high costs.63 
Instead, the Rowe court reasoned that ESI differed from paper records in 
that the “underlying assumption [for paper records] is that the party 
retaining information does so because that information is useful to it, as 
demonstrated by the fact that it is willing to bear the costs of retention.”64 
For ESI, however, the cost of storage is so minimal that a party may 
choose to retain it “not because it is expected to be used, but because 
there is no compelling reason to discard it.”65 Therefore, the Rowe court 
refused to presume that a party storing information electronically had 
assumed the risk of having to produce it at high costs.66 Yet even though 
the Rowe court rejected the flat assumption-of-risk approach, it did 
encourage courts to consider “the purposes for which the responding 
party maintains the requested data” as part of its eight-factor cost-
shifting test.67 If the responding party retained the documents in an 
inaccessible format only (a) because it had simply neglected to delete it 
or (b) for emergency retrieval, this factor should weigh against requiring 
that party to produce the ESI at its own expense and in favor of cost 
shifting.68 The court reasoned that a party should be required to produce 
the documents only if it also expected to have to retrieve those 
documents as part of its normal business activities.69 Thus, although the 
Rowe court considered the assumption-of-risk approach to be extreme 
and unreasonable, it still found that prelitigation document management 
would be relevant to determining whether to require production or cost 
shifting.70 If the purpose for which the responding party retained the ESI 
indicated that retrieval was expected or foreseeable, then a court should 
more strongly consider requiring the responding party to produce the 
documents at its own expense. 
In Zubulake I, however, Judge Scheindlin went even further than 
the Rowe court and explicitly rejected consideration of the reasonableness 
factor entirely.71 Judge Scheindlin was more concerned with whether the 
responding party could demonstrate that the ESI was inaccessible than 
with why it was inaccessible: “Whether the data is kept for a business 
purpose or for disaster recovery does not affect its accessibility, which is 
the practical basis for calculating the cost of production.”72 According to 
 
 63. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 431. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 429–31. 
 71. 217 F.R.D. 309, 321–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 72. Id. at 321–22. 
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Zubulake I, if a party can demonstrate that ESI is inaccessible, it does 
not matter why it was inaccessible; a court should simply weigh the costs 
of production against its likely benefits by considering other relevant 
cost-shifting factors.73 Therefore, Zubulake I’s seven-factor cost-shifting 
test contains no mention of the reasonableness or purpose of the 
responding party’s document-management system.74 This decision had a 
strong influence on the 2006 amendments and Advisory Committee 
notes, and led to the elimination of standards of reasonableness in the 
storing of ESI.75 
C. The 2006 Amendments and the Two-Tiered Approach to 
E-Discovery 
To protect civil litigants against disproportionate discovery costs, 
when Congress amended the FRCP in 2006, it designed a balancing test 
to help courts determine whether to compel, protect against, or shift the 
costs of production (FRCP 26(b)(2)’s “two-tiered approach”).76 
FRCP 26(b)(2) and its corresponding Advisory Committee notes—like 
Zubulake I, from which they stem—contain no mention of prelitigation 
document management. As a result, after the 2006 amendments to the 
discovery rules, few courts have considered a party’s unreasonable 
prelitigation document management when deciding whether to grant 
motions to compel or to protect inaccessible ESI.77 
Since 2006, under the newly amended FRCP 34(b), a party may 
elect to produce ESI to opposing counsel in the form in which it retains 
the ESI in its ordinary course of business.78 This reflects the Advisory 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. The seven Zubulake I factors, 217 F.R.D. at 322, include:  
(1) The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information; 
(2) The availability of such information from other sources; (3) The total cost of production, 
compared to the amount in controversy; (4) The total cost of production, compared to the 
resources available to each party; (5) The relative ability of each party to control costs and 
its incentive to do so; (6) The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) The 
relative costs to the parties of obtaining the information.  
 75. Cf. Quinby v. WestLB AG (Quinby II), No. 04 Civ. 7406 (WHP) (HBP), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 64531, at *101–02 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006). The court in Quinby II applied the seven-factor 
Zubulake I test for cost-shifting, but also looked at the reasonableness of the inaccessibility of the ESI. 
Id. at *105. Because the responding party had failed to institute a litigation hold or to preserve ESI 
that was previously active but now inaccessible, the court required that party to produce the 
documents at its own expense. Id. However, the Advisory Committee did not take this case into 
consideration when it drafted the 2006 amendments. Silbert, supra note 58, ¶ 34. 
 76. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B)–(C) (setting forth the two-tiered approach). 
 77. W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38, 43–45 (D. Mass. 2007) (emphasizing 
the unreasonable nature of a party’s prelitigation document management, but not officially considering it 
when deciding whether to compel production). 
 78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b). 
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Committee’s assumption that ESI produced in the ordinary course of 
business already exists in a reasonably usable format.79 Nevertheless, the 
Committee recognized that: 
  Some electronically stored information may be ordinarily maintained 
in a form that is not reasonably usable by any party. . . . The questions 
whether a producing party should be required to convert such 
information to a more usable form, or should be required to produce it 
at all, should be addressed under Rule 26(b)(2)(B).80 
FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) relates to ESI that is “inaccessible,” meaning ESI 
that is extremely burdensome and costly to produce.81 Courts apply this 
rule when a party moves either for an order compelling the production of 
ESI or for an order protecting ESI against production.82 Once the party 
responding to a document request has made a showing that the ESI is 
inaccessible, the court performs a balancing test to determine whether to 
compel or to protect against production.83 Under the balancing test, a 
court determines whether the benefits of production would outweigh the 
costs, and the requesting party is invited to show “good cause” for 
requiring production.84 The factors that courts take into consideration for 
the “good cause” analysis appear in FRCP 26(b)(2)(C), and include 
whether 
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or 
can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had 
ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; 
or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at 
stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues.85 
The balancing of (1) the burdens and costs of producing inaccessible ESI 
against (2) the reasons to require production has often been referred to 
as the two-tiered approach for ESI discovery.86 Like the seven-factor 
 
 79. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 82. Id. Courts also have applied FRCP 26(b)(2) in situations where a party is under a duty to 
preserve and moves for a protective order that would allow it to continue destroying certain 
documents that are overly costly and burdensome to preserve. See, e.g., Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 
Civ. 0377 (CM) (JLC), 2011 WL 4701849, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011). 
 83. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B)–(C). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
 86. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, The “Two-Tiered” Approach to E-Discovery: Has Rule 26(b)(2)(B) 
Fulfilled Its Promise?, 14 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 7, ¶ 7 (2008), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v14i3/article7.pdf; 
Douglas L. Rogers, A Search for Balance in the Discovery of ESI Since December 1, 2006, 14 Rich. J.L. & 
Tech. 8, ¶ 112 (2008), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v14i3/article8.pdf (“The ESI Rules create a two-tier system 
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Zubulake I test, the rules establishing the two-tiered approach do not 
instruct courts to consider why the ESI would be costly and burdensome 
to produce. 
Courts and commentators disagree about whether during a litigation 
hold a party’s unreasonable ESI management, which results in relevant 
documents becoming inaccessible, should influence a court’s decision 
about whether to require production.87 This debate, however, has not yet 
extended to whether unreasonable prelitigation document management 
should be a factor. Unreasonable document management, both during and 
prior to litigation, often is inherently relevant to whether the responding 
party should be required to produce inaccessible documents, and courts 
should take it into consideration when performing a good cause analysis 
under FRCP 26(b)(2)(C).88 
In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (“Zubulake IV”), Judge 
Scheindlin, considering the reasonableness of document management 
during a litigation hold, noted that parties may choose any number of 
ways of organizing their documents, “[i]n recognition of the fact that 
there are many ways to manage electronic data.”89 Although this is 
inevitably true given the enormous variety of document-management 
software and technology, this hands-off approach, where courts do not 
even inquire into the reason for high production costs, has led to results 
that are inconsistent with historical notions of reasonableness in 
document management. 
For example, in Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, the defendant failed to 
institute a litigation hold for approximately three-and-a-half years after 
litigation was foreseeable.90 As a result of the defendant’s unreasonable 
document management, by the time the parties became engaged in 
discovery, many previously “active” documents were available only on 
backup tapes and thus inaccessible for purposes of FRCP 26(b)(2)(B).91 
The defendant requested a protective order for the inaccessible 
documents.92 Because it had failed to comply with its duty to preserve 
relevant documents, the defendant was entirely at fault for causing the 
requested ESI to become costly and burdensome to produce.93 
 
of discovery.”). 
 87. Compare Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587, 617–18 (D.N.J. 2010) (granting a 
protective order for documents rendered inaccessible during a litigation hold), with Rogers, supra 
note 86, ¶ 135 (arguing that good cause “clearly arises” if a party allows ESI to become inaccessible 
during a litigation hold). 
 88. See infra Part II.E. 
 89. 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 90. 720 F. Supp. 2d 587. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 617. 
 93. See id. at 618. 
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Nevertheless, the documents in question would have cost $1.5 million to 
restore, and therefore a magistrate judge in the District of New Jersey 
found that they were “inaccessible” under FRCP 26(b)(2)(B).94 Without 
seriously considering the fact that the defendant’s failure to properly 
manage its system had resulted in the inaccessibility of the documents, 
the judge applied the two-tiered test and concluded that the cost of 
production outweighed the possibility that the materials would be 
relevant.95 The judge therefore granted the defendant’s motion for a 
protective order.96 
The district court found that the magistrate judge had not 
misapplied the two-tiered test.97 Significantly, the court held that there is 
no “bright line rule” as to whether “a protective order under FRCP 
26(b)(2)(B) can ever be granted to a party when the evidence is 
inaccessible because of that party’s failure to institute a litigation hold.”98 
Important to the court’s holding was the fact that “[n]othing in the plain 
language of FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) requires such a threshold determination 
of who is at fault for the data having become inaccessible.”99 However, 
although the court did not find that the magistrate judge had abused his 
discretion, it made an interesting observation with respect to how a 
responding party’s culpability could factor into the two-tiered test.100 It 
noted that when performing the “good cause” analysis, a court might 
take into consideration the fault of the defendant in causing the data to 
become inaccessible,101 even though it is not a factor listed in 
FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) or the Advisory Committee notes. 
A number of courts and commentators have suggested that poor 
information management of the responding party during a litigation hold 
is relevant and that courts should factor it into the good cause analysis 
under FRCP 26(b)(2)(C).102 The duty to preserve potentially relevant 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 618–19. 
 96. Id. at 618. 
 97. Id. at 621. 
 98. Id. at 619. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 621. 
 102. Advante Int’l Corp. v. Mintel Learning Tech., No. C. 05-01022 JW (RS), 2006 WL 3371576, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2006); Rogers, supra note 86, ¶ 135 (“[G]ood cause to order the search of 
inaccessible ESI clearly arises when the requesting party shows that the producing party allowed the 
destruction of ESI in accessible format when it had an obligation to preserve documents.” (citing 
Disability Rights Council of Greater Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 147–48 
(D.D.C. 2007))); see Disability Rights Council, 242 F.R.D. at 148 (considering a party’s failure to 
institute a litigation hold as part of the good cause analysis). In Disability Rights Council of Greater 
Washington v. Washington Metro Transit Authority, the court stated, “[T]here is absolutely no other 
source from which electronically stored information can be secured, thanks to WMATA’s failure to 
impose a litigation hold.” 242 F.R.D. at 148. 
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information after anticipating litigation is one of the only standards103 the 
law imposes on civil litigants with respect to document management.104 To 
allow active documents that are potentially relevant to impending 
litigation to become inaccessible and then seek to avoid production 
reflects at least negligent conduct, and certainly should influence a 
court’s decision about whether to compel production. When documents 
are rendered inaccessible due to unreasonable document management 
before litigation is anticipated, the responsible party might not be as 
culpable as those that allow documents to become inaccessible during a 
litigation hold. But courts should still take it into consideration, along 
with the totality of the circumstances, when performing a good cause 
analysis.105 Since the 2006 amendments to the discovery rules, however, 
courts have not applied any standards on parties relating to prelitigation 
document management. 
For example, in W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, LLC, the plaintiffs 
sued the defendant in the District of Massachusetts for failing to properly 
administer an ERISA plan and requested copies of all medical claim files 
associated with that plan.106 The defendant, prior to the filing of litigation, 
had indexed scanned copies of all of its claim forms by processing date 
and the name of the claims examiner.107 The image files contained no 
searchable information about the particular ERISA plan or group to 
which the claims related.108 At first, the court granted the plaintiff’s 
motion to compel production of the forms.109 However, the defendants 
asked the court to reconsider its order to compel, arguing that the forms 
requested were inaccessible and that it would be unduly burdensome and 
costly to produce them given that they were not searchable by group.110 
The court found that retrieval would indeed be burdensome and costly 
under FRCP 26(b)(2)(B), but noted: 
 
 103. The other standard of reasonableness in document management applied by some federal 
courts appears in a spoliation analysis, which often intersects with the duty to preserve. See infra 
Part II.D. 
 104. Unlike the Major Tours court, other courts have reviewed a failure to properly institute a 
litigation hold under the common law rules regarding spoliation rather than under the FRCP 26 two-
tiered test. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(describing the lower court’s application of a spoliation analysis to address one party’s failure to 
produce requested documents); Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Doe 
v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 375–76 (D. Conn. 2007). Determining whether to require 
production of inaccessible documents through application of a spoliation analysis is improper, 
however, especially after the 2006 amendments to FRCP 26(b)(2)(B)–(C). See infra Part II.D. 
 105. See infra Part II.E. 
 106. 245 F.R.D. 38, 40 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 107. Id. at 41. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 40. 
 110. Id. at 42. 
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I am hard pressed to understand the rationale behind having a system 
that is only searchable by year of processing, then claims examiner, 
then the month of processing, and finally the claims date. None of 
these search criteria reflect the name of the individual claimant, the 
date that the claimant received the medical service, who the provider 
was, or even the company that employed the benefit holder. It would 
seem that such a system would only serve to discourage audits and the 
type of inquiries that have led to the instant litigation.111 
Nevertheless, given that unreasonable organization of ESI is not a 
factor listed in the two-tiered balancing test, the court did not actually 
take it into account when performing its FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) good cause 
analysis.112 The fact that the court mentioned it at all, however, 
demonstrates that reasonableness of prelitigation document management 
is inherently relevant to the question of whether the responding party 
should be required to produce inaccessible ESI at its own expense. 
D. Reasonableness in Spoliation Law 
Even after Congress’s 2006 enactment of FRCP 26(b)(2)(B), a rule 
specifically designed to help courts determine whether to compel 
production of inaccessible documents, some courts performing that very 
inquiry have improperly applied a common law spoliation analysis 
instead.113 The common law doctrine of spoliation generally arises when 
(1) a party was under a duty to preserve the information at issue, (2) that 
party acted with culpability in failing to preserve that information or in 
actively destroying it, and (3) the other party suffered prejudice as a 
result of not having access to relevant information.114 Given the difficulty 
of demonstrating the relevance of documents that have disappeared, 
most courts will presume relevance and prejudice under the third prong 
where the responding party acted with a high level of culpability in 
destroying or failing to preserve the information.115 Thus, the culpability 
 
 111. Id. at 43. 
 112. Id. at 43–45. However, considering the factors listed in FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) alone, the court did 
find that the plaintiffs had demonstrated good cause for production, and denied the defendant’s 
motion for reconsideration. Id. at 44–45. 
 113. See, e.g., Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Doe v. 
Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 375–76 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 114. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery Sanctions in the Twenty-
First Century, 11 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 71, 80 (2004) (“[A] typical sanctioned party is a 
defendant that destroys electronic information in violation of a court order, in a manner that is willful 
or in bad faith, or causes prejudice to the opposing party.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“When evidence is destroyed in 
bad faith (i.e., intentionally or willfully), that fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate relevance.”); see 
also Scheindlin & Wangkeo, supra note 114, at 84. (“[C]ourts have been less concerned with proof of 
prejudice when faced with willful or bad faith conduct.”). There seems to be a “sliding scale” with 
respect to whether sanctions are premised on culpability or prejudice; based on a case study, Shira 
Scheindlin and Kanchana Wangkeo conclude that “the more prejudice there is, the less willfulness 
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of the responding party in losing or destroying documents often becomes 
crucial to the spoliation analysis. 
Some courts have performed a spoliation analysis when determining 
whether to require production of information rendered inaccessible 
during a litigation hold,116 further demonstrating that courts consider the 
culpability of the responding party in failing to institute a reasonable 
document-management system to be intrinsically relevant to whether 
that party should bear the expense of producing inaccessible documents. 
The law must draw a distinction, however, between spoliated evidence 
and inaccessible ESI. The major difference is that with spoliation, the 
information is irretrievable, whereas with inaccessible information, a 
court may decide to require retrieval under certain circumstances. The 
spoliation analysis is thus more appropriate where ESI has been lost or 
destroyed than where ESI is inaccessible.117 Courts must now, therefore, 
apply FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) when considering whether to require 
production of inaccessible ESI. Yet taking a brief look at how courts 
have applied standards of reasonableness in document management 
under a spoliation analysis helps demonstrate (1) that unreasonable 
management of an information system is often intrinsically related to 
whether a party should be required to produce inaccessible documents 
and (2) the need for uniform, clear standards of culpability and 
reasonableness in document management. 
The culpability factor under the spoliation test, which, depending on 
the jurisdiction, instructs courts to consider whether the party acted 
intentionally, in bad faith, or unreasonably in destroying relevant 
information, is one of the only standards of reasonableness with respect 
to document management actually articulated in the discovery rules 
applied by federal courts.118 Spoliation is not mentioned at all in the 
FRCP and is analyzed inconsistently across jurisdictions. The doctrine of 
spoliation was developed under state law, and states have adopted 
different definitions of and rules relating to spoliation. California, for 
 
courts require before sanctioning a party for e-discovery violations, and vice versa.” Scheindlin & 
Wangkeo, supra note 114, at 89. 
 116. See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(applying a spoliation analysis where the documents were neither lost nor destroyed but simply not 
produced in time for trial and existed on relatively inaccessible backup tapes). 
 117. Id. at 106 (noting that because the responding party had simply failed to produce requested 
documents rather than destroying them, this was “not a typical spoliation case” but was “more akin to 
[cases] in which a party breaches a discovery obligation or fails to comply with a court order”). The 
confusion over what type of authority the court has to impose sanctions and which rules apply 
highlights the lack of clarity in the discovery rules. 
 118. The other standard of reasonableness in document management is the duty to collect and 
preserve potentially relevant documents after anticipating litigation. See supra Part II.C. These two 
standards often overlap because a failure to comply with the duty to preserve often results in a motion 
for sanctions for spoliation.  
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example, prescribes both civil and criminal penalties for spoliation of 
documents: “Every person who, knowing that any [document or other 
evidence] is about to be produced in evidence upon any trial, inquiry, or 
investigation whatever, authorized by law, willfully destroys or conceals 
the same, with intent thereby to prevent it from being produced, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor.”119 And at trial, the court may provide an adverse-
inference instruction to the jury if it determines that a party willfully 
failed to produce documents.120 California courts have great discretion to 
provide adverse-inference instructions and are “free to adapt [instructions] 
to fit the circumstances of the case, including the egregiousness of the 
spoliation and the strength and nature of the inference arising from the 
spoliation.”121 In New York, by contrast, “[s]poliation sanctions are 
appropriate where a litigant, intentionally or negligently, disposes of 
crucial items of evidence.”122 And if litigation is foreseeable, the failure to 
preserve relevant documents may also justify the imposition of spoliation 
sanctions.123 
The Eighth Circuit case of Stevenson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 
serves as an example of how the reasonableness of a document-
management system plays into a spoliation analysis.124 In that case, the 
plaintiff sued the defendant railroad company after he was seriously 
injured and his wife was killed during a collision with a train.125 He moved 
for sanctions on the ground that the railroad company destroyed a “tape 
of conversations between the train crew and dispatch at the time of the 
accident.”126 The defendant argued that it should not be subject to 
sanctions because it had destroyed the tapes in accordance with its 
document-retention policy of re-recording over the tapes after ninety 
days.127 Nevertheless, the district court found that the defendant had 
destroyed the tapes in bad faith and was subject to sanctions for 
spoliation.128 
In making its determination, the court considered “(1) whether the 
record retention policy is reasonable considering the facts and 
 
 119. Cal. Penal Code § 135 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 120. “If you find that a party willfully [suppressed] [,] [altered] [,] [damaged] [,] [concealed] [, or] 
[destroyed] evidence in order to prevent its being used in this trial, you may consider that fact in 
determining what inferences to draw from the evidence.” West’s Comm. on Cal. Civil Jury 
Instructions, California Civil Jury Instructions (BAJI) § 2.03 (2012) (brackets in original). 
 121. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 517 (Cal. 1998). 
 122. Abar v. Freightliner Corp., 617 N.Y.S.2d 209, 212 (App. Div. 1994) (emphasis added). 
 123. Enstrom v. Garden Place Hotel, 811 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264 (App. Div. 2006). 
 124. See 354 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 125. Id. at 742. 
 126. Id. at 743. 
 127. Id. at 747. 
 128. Id. at 746. 
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circumstances surrounding those documents, (2) whether lawsuits or 
complaints have been filed frequently concerning the type of records at 
issue, and (3) whether the document retention policy was instituted in 
bad faith.”129 The district court found that the defendant “had been 
involved in many grade crossing collisions and knew that the taped 
conversations would be relevant in any potential litigation regarding an 
accident that resulted in death and serious injury.”130 Additionally, in past 
cases, the defendant “had preserved such tapes . . . where it was helpful 
to [its] position.”131 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that the district 
court had not abused its discretion because all of these circumstances 
“create[d] a sufficiently strong inference of an intent to destroy [the voice 
tape] for the purpose of suppressing [relevant] evidence.”132 
Stevenson illustrates how a court performs a reasonableness analysis 
under the doctrine of spoliation: by considering whether a party’s failure 
to manage its information in a way designed to preserve relevant 
information was reasonable under the totality of circumstances. Because 
the defendant had selectively preserved some such tapes in the past and 
knew that the tapes would be relevant to litigation, the court found that 
its failure to preserve the tapes was so unreasonable as to indicate bad 
faith management of its information system. Just as unreasonable 
document management is inherently relevant to whether a party has 
acted culpably in destroying relevant evidence, it is also inherently 
relevant to whether the party should be required to produce ESI which 
that party has rendered inaccessible but has not actually destroyed. And 
as explained in the next Subpart,133 courts should perform a 
reasonableness inquiry (similar to the reasonableness inquiry performed 
by the court in Stevenson) when deciding whether to require production 
of inaccessible ESI, and should consider reasonableness as a factor when 
performing the balancing test under FRCP 26(b)(2)(B). 
Federal courts do not clearly or uniformly apply spoliation law and 
its standards of reasonableness in document management. The circuit 
courts are split over the level of culpability required under the second 
prong, ranging from a mere negligence standard in the Second Circuit134 
to an intentional destruction standard in the Eighth Circuit.135 The 
 
 129. Id. (emphasis added). 
 130. Id. at 747. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 748. 
 133. See infra Part II.E. 
 134. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding 
that the lower court had erred in finding that there must be gross negligence or bad faith to satisfy the 
“culpable state of mind” requirement). 
 135. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007) (requiring “a finding of 
intentional destruction indicating a desire to suppress the truth” before allowing the imposition of 
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circuits that require bad faith or intentional destruction set an extremely 
high bar for demonstrating that sanctions are appropriate, and it is often 
unclear whether a failure to institute a litigation hold would meet the 
requisite level of culpability. 
For example, the Fifth Circuit requires a showing of bad faith. In 
Escobar v. City of Houston, a police department became subject to a 
litigation hold sixty days after a particular incident occurred.136 However, 
it failed to halt its routine destruction of electronic communications over 
ninety days old and, as a result, communications relating to the incident 
in question were permanently deleted approximately one month after 
the trigger date.137 The Fifth Circuit held that the department’s failure to 
comply with its duty to preserve did not by itself rise to the level of bad 
faith without further evidence of culpability.138 In contrast, a Connecticut 
district court, in Doe v. Norwalk Community College, held that a failure 
to institute any sort of litigation hold after anticipating litigation 
automatically amounts to gross negligence or recklessness and satisfies 
both the second and third prongs of the spoliation analysis with respect 
to culpability and prejudice.139 As Doe, Escobar, Stevenson, and the 
California and New York approaches demonstrate, the standards of 
reasonableness for spoliation and the treatment of a failure to preserve 
documents during a litigation hold vary greatly between courts. Given 
the lack of uniformity, it becomes difficult for litigants to understand 
their document-management obligations and to predict at what point a 
failure to comply with those obligations would give rise to sanctions. 
Courts often fail to differentiate between what constitutes spoliation 
and when sanctions would be warranted, which contributes to a lack of 
clarity in spoliation law. Whether spoliation has occurred and whether 
the responsible party is be subject to sanctions should be two entirely 
separate inquiries, much like the difference between determining 
whether a lower court has committed an error and whether that error 
was harmful and warrants reversal. Therefore, in articulating spoliation 
standards, Congress and the courts might establish a lower, reasonable 
person standard for determining whether spoliation has occurred, and 
then establish a gradient for what types of sanctions are warranted based 
on minimum levels of culpability. For example, the culpability required 
for imposing a light monetary sanction might be negligence, whereas the 
culpability required for imposing an adverse-inference instruction or 
dismissing a claim entirely might be bad faith or intentional destruction. 
 
sanctions for spoliation). 
 136. No. 04-1945, 2007 WL 2900581, at *17 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2007). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at *18. 
 139. 248 F.R.D. 372, 379–81 (D. Conn. 2007). 
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The establishment of clear standards would help to eliminate confusion 
in the courts and among litigants about standards for document 
management during litigation holds. 
After the 2006 amendments, FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) and (C) apply 
specifically to inaccessible ESI.140 As a result, if a failure to institute a 
litigation hold leads to active ESI becoming inaccessible rather than to 
destruction of the ESI, courts should perform the two-tiered 
FRCP 26(b)(2) test rather than a spoliation analysis. Unfortunately, the 
plain language of FRCP 26(b)’s two-tiered test makes no mention of the 
reasonableness of the responding party’s document-management system 
or the culpability of the responding party. Furthermore, no consensus 
exists as to whether unreasonable information management is relevant to 
the determination of whether a party should be required to produce 
inaccessible ESI. Yet if a party has unreasonably rendered potentially 
relevant ESI inaccessible, that fact is inherently relevant to whether the 
court should compel production, just as a party’s unreasonable loss or 
destruction of relevant evidence is inherently relevant to whether 
spoliation sanctions are warranted. The following Subpart proposes why 
and how courts should take reasonableness in document management 
into account when performing FRCP 26(b)(2)(B)’s balancing test. 
E. Proposed Standards of Reasonableness in Document 
Management 
Neither FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) and (C), which establish the two-tiered 
approach, nor the accompanying Advisory Committee notes, explicitly 
discuss the reasonableness of storing ESI in an inaccessible format. The 
language of the rule and the Advisory Committee notes suggest, 
however, that Congress intended for courts to consider factors beyond 
those listed in subsection (C) when performing the good cause analysis.141 
Subsection (C)(iii) explains that, in determining whether good cause 
exists for requiring production, a court should consider whether “the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, 
considering the needs of the case.”142 The Advisory Committee elaborates 
that the good cause prong under FRCP 26(b)(2)(C) allows courts to 
consider “whether [the] burdens and costs can be justified in the 
 
 140. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B)–(C). 
 141. At least one court agrees that the factors listed in the rule and Advisory Committee notes are 
nonexhaustive. See Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587, 619 (D.N.J. 2010) (suggesting 
that the culpability of a party responding to a discovery request in allowing active documents to 
become inaccessible during a litigation hold would be a factor contributing to a finding of good cause 
for production under FRCP 26(b)(2)(C)). 
 142. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (emphasis added). 
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circumstances of the case.”143 The Committee then goes on to list factors, 
more specific than those listed in FRCP 26(b)(2)(C), that courts “may” 
take into consideration: 
Appropriate considerations may include: (1) the specificity of the 
discovery request; (2) the quantity of information available from other 
and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant 
information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available 
on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant, 
responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more 
easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and 
usefulness of the further information; (6) the importance of the issues 
at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties’ resources.144 
The language, particularly the insertion of the word “may,” suggests 
that the Committee did not intend for this list to be exhaustive and that it 
contemplated that other factors might also be relevant to the good cause 
analysis. If the responding party’s document-management system 
unreasonably causes ESI to become inaccessible, this should constitute 
one of the “needs” or “circumstances” of the case that might justify the 
“burdens and costs” of requiring production.145 Thus, if a court 
determines that the party responding to a discovery request caused the 
requested ESI to become inaccessible or that it unreasonably stored the 
ESI in an inaccessible format, the court may and should consider that 
fact when determining whether the requesting party has demonstrated 
good cause for production. 
The Advisory Committee might have shied away from explicitly 
mentioning the reasonableness of document-management systems, 
despite its inherent relevance, because consideration of this factor likely 
would increase the costs of e-discovery, at least initially. One of the main 
purposes of the 2006 amendments, after all, was to introduce an element 
of proportionality in the two-tiered approach in an effort to reduce 
costs.146 Unfortunately, under the current cost-benefit analysis paradigm, 
instituting a new, discovery-friendly document-management system 
likely would increase costs without much accompanying benefit; if a 
party maintains its old system it can simply claim that the ESI is 
inaccessible and likely avoid producing it. In other words, the current 
system disincentivizes technological advancement in information 
management. Courts should alter this cost-benefit analysis and 
incentivize the adoption of discovery-friendly document-management 
systems. 
 
 143. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment) (emphasis added). 
 144. Id. (emphasis added). 
 145. Id.  
 146. See Rachel Hytken, Note, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006 Amendments 
Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 875, 885 (2008). 
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Courts could alter the cost-benefit analysis and incentivize 
technological advancement by refusing to grant protective orders or to 
shift costs where the inaccessibility of ESI is unreasonable147 under the 
circumstances of the case. Courts should consider the nature of the 
parties involved in the case and hold large companies that are frequently 
involved in litigation accountable when they organize their records in a 
manner that unreasonably obstructs discovery. This is not to say that 
large companies should be obligated to preserve all ESI eternally.148 To 
the contrary, companies may continue to institute and comply with 
document-retention policies and permanently delete information not 
relevant to any reasonably foreseeable litigation. Instead, courts should 
encourage large companies to reduce their own future discovery costs by 
keeping those documents that they choose to retain in an accessible, 
discovery-friendly format. If a party fails to exercise reasonableness in its 
document management, then it should be more likely to suffer the 
consequences of having to produce the documents at its own expense. 
For companies that expect to be involved in litigation at some point, this 
accountability would incentivize the adoption of document-management 
systems that facilitate efficient collection of potentially relevant 
documents. 
Such an approach also would create a monetary incentive for 
companies to dispose of ESI that they no longer have any reason to 
store, and thereby reduce the enormous volume of ESI to be collected 
and searched. As the Rowe court indicated, part of the reason that ESI 
collection costs are so high is that people now store enormous amounts 
of information that they never would have retained if it existed on 
paper.149 Providing a “compelling reason to discard”150 ESI that is 
irrelevant to any business purpose would help put ESI back on a level 
playing field with paper documents, as the Advisory Committee desired. 
Yet deciding to take the reasonableness of a party’s document 
management into account does not end the inquiry. Courts also must 
consider what standards of reasonableness apply under the circumstances. 
This Note does not suggest that companies should be required to organize 
ESI in one particular manner. Such an approach would be inconsistent 
 
 147. This approach is in line with the Sedona Conference best practice guidelines. See Sedona 
Conference, supra note 52, at 12 (“The hallmark of an organization’s information and records 
management policies should be reasonableness.”). 
 148. See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *4 
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) (noting that a large company routinely involved in various lawsuits did not 
have an ongoing duty to preserve virtually all inaccessible ESI, even though the company was almost 
constantly subject to litigation holds); Sedona Conference, supra note 52, at 13 (“Defensible policies 
need not mandate the retention of all information and documents.”). 
 149. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 150. Id. 
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with the fact that rapidly changing technology means that more efficient 
management systems frequently become available. Moreover, business 
autonomy is an extremely important consideration; businesses must have 
the flexibility to organize their records in a way that makes business 
sense. Many companies, particularly large ones, already factor litigation 
expenses into their business models and expect that they will, at some 
point, become engaged in litigation. For such companies, it makes 
business sense to organize records in a manner that would facilitate, or at 
least not unreasonably hinder, inexpensive discovery. 
To properly determine the reasonableness of a party’s document-
management system, a court must fully understand the technological and 
financial capabilities of the parties.151 For example, a small, family-owned 
business that never anticipated being involved in litigation should be held 
to a different standard of reasonableness than is a large company that 
frequently becomes entangled in lawsuits.152 Additionally, both parties 
may help a court to analyze the circumstances of any given case by 
making use of expert witnesses.153 Courts should encourage responding 
parties to explain the reasons for and relative costs of managing records 
in other, more accessible formats, and should consider whether the 
organization of the responding party’s system was reasonable based on 
all of the circumstances.  
To avoid case-by-case, highly discretionary analyses of their 
document-management systems, large companies also should consider 
joining with others in their respective industries to draft industry-specific 
guidelines for ESI management. Industry guidelines have assisted with 
other litigation-related corporate management issues. For example, the 
Kings County Medical Society and Kings County Bar Association 
formed a committee of attorneys and physicians to draft guidelines for 
attorneys and physicians.154 The guidelines covered the handling of 
medical records and reports; communications with and depositions of 
treating physicians; how to obtain expert medical opinions; calling 
 
 151. See Sedona Conference, supra note 52, at 12 (“Judging reasonableness includes considering 
the substantial efforts required to understand new technologies and to adopt policies governing the 
management of electronic information and records.”). 
 152. A court should consider the fact that a small, privately owned business might find it much 
more financially burdensome to adopt an expensive, discovery-friendly management system than would a 
larger, more profitable business. Therefore, a court should be less likely to find the small business’s 
failure to adopt such a system unreasonable, having considered all of those circumstances. In practice, 
however, the distinction between small and large businesses is unlikely to raise much of a problem 
because small businesses often do not generate enough ESI to cause e-discovery cost problems. 
 153. At least one court actually required that the parties meet the standards of FRE 702 
(governing expert testimony) while hashing out a motion to compel that related to the sufficiency of 
certain search terms. United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 154. King Cnty. Medical Society & King Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Interprofessional Handbook: 
Guidelines for Physicians and Attorneys (2004). 
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physicians as witnesses; and appropriate medical expert fees, such as for 
the handling of medical records and reports, among other medical 
malpractice litigation matters.155 Industry guidelines for document 
management similarly would be useful for facilitating inexpensive 
discovery and efficient resolution of discovery disputes. The existence of 
industry-specific guidelines would allow responding parties to emphasize 
their compliance with industry standards in defending the reasonableness 
of their document-management systems in court. Finally, if a court 
determines that a responding party’s document-management system is 
unreasonably inaccessible under all of the circumstances, it may consider 
that as one factor contributing to a finding of good cause for production 
under FRCP 26(b)(2)(C). 
Such an approach to resolving e-discovery disputes ultimately will 
decrease litigation costs because it creates an incentive for large 
businesses to more efficiently manage their ESI even prior to the 
institution of a litigation hold. If it becomes clear to large companies that 
courts will refuse to grant protective orders where storing ESI in an 
inaccessible format is unreasonable, companies that expect to be 
involved in litigation will be more likely to take it upon themselves to 
adopt more reasonable document-management systems to reduce their 
own future discovery costs. 
Some might object that factoring in the reasonableness of the 
document-management system will increase the costs of e-discovery 
because it will impose on companies the cost of adopting new methods of 
document management, and might result in requiring certain parties to 
produce documents despite the high cost of doing so. Although this is 
true in the short-term, such an objection is shortsighted. Providing 
incentives for companies to adopt more efficient document-management 
systems will cause them to search for the cheapest, most efficient way to 
organize their documents with an eye toward decreased costs of 
collection during discovery. This, in turn, will increase demand in the 
marketplace for discovery-friendly technology and software. Given the 
rate at which technology is already adapting to help companies reduce 
litigation costs, we can expect that increased demand will only foster 
further adaptation and innovation.156 
 
 155. See id. at 1–3. 
 156. See Clayton M. Christensen et al., The Innovator’s Prescription: A Disruptive Solution 
for Health Care (2009) for an interesting theory on how to develop efficient, inexpensive solutions in 
industries where the costs of products or services are too high. According to Christensen, “sustaining 
innovations” differ from “disruptive innovations.” Unlike sustaining innovations, the purpose of which is 
to “maintain the existing trajectory of performance improvement in the established market,” disruptive 
innovations actually “transform an industry” by making the products or services “affordable and 
accessible.” Id. at 2, 4–5. In many cases, existing industry leaders fail to foster disruptive innovation not 
because “they lack . . . money or technological expertise,” but because they “lack the motivation to focus 
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Conclusion 
Changing technology has led to more efficient communications and 
better-organized business records. However, it has also had the unjust 
side effect of inflating the costs of civil litigation discovery to the point 
that parties often settle cases rather than foot the bill for manually 
combing through millions of documents.157 According to a 2009 Federal 
Judiciary Survey, problems arose in twenty-five percent of cases 
involving e-discovery.158 Significantly, “[t]he most common problem [in 
those cases] was a dispute that could not be resolved without court action 
over the burden of production of ESI.”159 To address this serious 
problem, courts must make every attempt to understand the technologies 
available to the parties and to apply standards of reasonableness in a 
changing technological environment. Imposing standards of 
reasonableness with respect to document review and management 
ultimately will foster innovation, reduce costs, and allow for the more 
efficient administration of justice. 
 
sufficient resources on the disruption.” Id. at 7. The industry providing technological tools for e-discovery 
is in desperate need of a disruptive innovation. Providing a motivation for such innovation could alter the 
marketplace in a way that fosters the development of cheap, efficient technologies that ultimately will 
reduce the cost of e-discovery dramatically. 
 157. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Federal Judicial Center 
National, Case-Based Civil Rules Survey: Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 73 (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ 
dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf. 
 158. Id. at 1. 
 159. Id. 
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